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Abstract
In this Note, the question of the IOC’s amenability to suit in a United States court will be
examined. The inquiry will require a determination of whether the IOC has the legal capacity to
be sued under international law, and whether that organization is immune from suit under United
States law. Finally, it must be determined whether the issues in Martin present a political question
and whether policy considerations make it advisable for the court to refrain from hearing the case.
IS THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
AMENABLE TO SUIT IN A UNITED STATES COURT?
INTRODUCTION
Martin v. International Olympic Committee' raises significant
issues regarding the adjudication of suits against international orga-
nizations in United States courts. In Martin, the question whether a
United States court can hear a suit against the International Olym-
pic Committee2 (IOC) is presented. The controversy will be re-
solved before the United States hosts the 1984 Summer Olympics.
3
The IOC, following its tradition, has scheduled the 5,000-
meter and 10,000-meter races only for men. 4 Female runners from
21 nations allege that the failure to hold them for women consti-
tutes sex discrimination in violation of state, federal and interna-
tional law. 5 They have filed suit against the IOC, the United States
Olympic Committee6 (USOC) and the Los Angeles Olympic Orga-
nizing Committee7 (LAOOC) seeking an injunction that would
1. No. 83-5847 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 9, 1983). The suit was filed in Los Angeles
Superior Court, and was removed to federal court. Id. For a recent development in Martin,
see infra note 163.
2. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
3. The modern Olympic Games were founded in 1896 to encourage world peace and
friendship and promote amateur athletics. 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, Olympic Games,
566 (1984). They consist of Summer Games and Winter Games, each of which are held in a
host city. Id. The host city provides the facilities for the events, and is the site for all of the
sports. Id. The Olympics feature sports that are widely popular, and bring together thou-
sands of the world's outstanding athletes. Id. at 571.
This year, 10,000 athletes from 150 nations will compete in Los Angeles, and the Games
are expected to generate almost U.S. $4 billion for the state and local economy. Eve of a New
Olympics, TIME, Oct. 17, 1983, at 81.
4. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
5. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
6. The USOC is responsible for United States participation in the Games. See infra notes
47-57 and accompanying text.
7. The LAOOC was created to organize and finance the Games. See infra notes 58-61
and accompanying text.
Ironically, the USOC and the LAOOC had earlier persuaded the IOC to add the
women's 3,000-meter race and the women's marathon to the 1984 Summer Olympics. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 12, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
Peter Ueberroth, the president of the Los Angeles committee, stated that he
was "offended" by the suit, in particular because his organization had fought to
include the women's marathon in the 1984 Olympics.
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require them to hold these events for women. 8
In this Note, the question of the IOC's amenability to suit in a
United States court will be examined. The inquiry will require a
determination of whether the IOC has the legal capacity to be sued
under international law, 9 and whether that organization is immune
from suit under United States law.' 0 Finally, it must be determined
whether the issues in Martin present a political question" and
whether policy considerations make it advisable for the court to
refrain from hearing the case. 12
I. THE ISSUES IN MARTIN
A. The Plaintiffs' Arguments
The plaintiffs allege that the California district court has juris-
diction over all of the defendants, including the 1OC, because the
Games are to be held in California.' 3 Although the IOC and the
"To include the L.A.O.O.C. in this suit is exploitive at best .... We have no
jurisdiction in this matter, and we have been sympathetic to the goals of women in
sports."
Id. at A19, cols. 3-4.
8. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and
Petition for Writ of Mandate (Sex Discrimination) at 20, Martin v. International Olympic
Comm., No. 83-5847 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 9, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Com-
plaint]. For a discussion of the failure to schedule the women's 5,000-meter and 10,000-meter
races, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
The plaintiffs exhausted their procedural remedies. Prior to filing the suit, they appealed
to the IOC to add these events, but the IOC refused. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra, at 13.
9. See inJra notes 68-85 and accompanying text. Legal capacity is defined as the "right
to come into court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (5th ed. 1979).
10. The executive branch has consistently promised the IOC that it would not interfere
with the IOC's operation of the Games. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text. In
addition, the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976), provides
immunity for some international organizations. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 119-34. Political questions are nonjusticiable
because they require action by the other branches of government, or because there are no
satisfactory criteria for judicial determination. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). "The
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."
Id.
12. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
13. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 3. The plaintiffs state that "[t]he site of the
Los Angeles Olympics is within the jurisdiction of this court." Id.
The defendants, in addition to the IOC, USOC and LAOOC, include the International
Amateur Athletic Federation, which has been granted authority by the IOC to establish the
rules and regulations of the various athletic events and recommend events for future Olym-
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USOC are based in Switzerland 14 and Colorado,' 5 respectively,
their contacts with the forum should enable California to assert
personal jurisdiction.' 6
pics, id. at 8-9, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, which maintains the Los Angeles
Coliseum. Id. at 7.
14. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE CHARTER rule 11 [hereinafter cited as IOC
CHARTER]
Although the issue is not raised by the parties, the court must determine whether Swiss
law or United States law applies to a suit against a Swiss corporation doing business in the
United States.
A federal court applies the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). California uses a governmental interest approach to
conflict of law questions, supplemented by a comparative impairment approach. Lettieri v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 627 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1980).
The first step in the analysis is to determine the applicable law. See generally Currie,
The Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26
U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). United States law may prohibit holding the 5,000-meter and
10,000-meter events for men only. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text. If Swiss law
also prohibits sex discrimination, no conflict exists between the relevant laws, and the law of
the forum state applies. Lettieri, 627 F.2d at 933.
If Swiss law and United States law appear to yield different results, there may be a "false
conflict." This could occur if the United States is the only state that has an interest in applying
its own law, or if Swiss law is not intended to apply outside of Switzerland. See generally
Currie, supra, at 10 (discussion of false conflicts). If there is a false conflict, the law of the
interested state applies, and the comparative impairment analysis applies to "cases posing a
true conflict." Lettieri, 627 F.2d at 933. It is possible that the facts in Martin present a "true
conflict." If the court determines that a true conflict exists, the final step in the analysis is to
determine which state has a greater interest in applying its law. Lettieri, 627 F.2d at 933.
Under California law, this is determined by analyzing which state's interest would be most
impaired if its law were not applied. Id.
15. The USOC is headquartered in Colorado Springs. INTERNAL REV. SERV., CUMULA-
TIVE LIST 1013 (1982).
16. Although it is unclear whether the signing of a contract that is being performed in
California would, by itself, make the IOC amenable to that state's long-arm jurisdiction,
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting), the IOC also solicited bids from Los Angeles, Eve of a New Olympics, TIME, Oct.
17, 1983, at 72-81, and the performance of the contract in its entirety will be in California.
"It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with that State." McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,, 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957). Here, the subject matter of the contract, the Summer Olympics, will be held in
California and run by a California corporation. See TIME, supra, at 72-81. It is necessary that
the defendant "purposefully avails itself" of the forum, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); that its conduct is certain to have an affiliation with the forum state, World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); and that it can foresee litigation
resulting from its connection with the forum state, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). The IOC required the LAOOC to demonstrate that Los
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The plaintiffs assert that the refusal to hold the 5,000-meter
and 10,000-meter events for women is unreasonable and discrimi-
natory,17 because women participate in these events frequently
enough to permit the IOC to offer them as Olympic events.' 8
According to the plaintiffs, failure to hold the track events for
women violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act 9 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,20 which allegedly prohibit sex discrimination in ath-
letic competitions. 2' The alleged discrimination also violates the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, 22 article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, 23 the Ama-
teur Sports Act, 24 and various principles of international law. 25
Angeles would be a suitable site for the Olympics, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text, before signing the contract. Since the LAOOC agreed to host the games in Los Angeles,
it was clear that the performance of the contract would be in California. In fact, a California
site was specifically chosen because it was suitable for the Olympics, and it was intended that
the contract would be performed there. TIME, supra, at 72-81. Accordingly, the conduct of
both the IOC and the USOC was purposeful within the meaning of Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253,
was foreseeable within the meaning of Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217, and established a sufficient
affiliation with the forum under World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
17. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 13-14. See infra text accompanying notes 18-
25.
18. "Plaintiffs have met all applicable requirements for inclusion of the women's 5,000-
M.[meterl and 10,000-M.[meter] races.' Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 13. The
applicable requirements that the plaintiffs have allegedly met are that their sport is widely
practiced in 25 countries and two continents. IOC CHARTER rule 32. A sport is widely
practiced in a country if national championships are held and the athletes participate in
international competition. Id.
19. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIv. CooE § 51 (West 1982). The Act prohibits
discrimination in all business establishments on the basis of race, color, creed, sex or national
origin. Id.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1976).
21. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 17.
22. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
23. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. This section guarantees equal protection under law. Id.
24. Amateur Sports Act of 1950 §§ 101-114, 36 U.S.C. § 392(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978).
25. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 18-20. The international law documents
mentioned include the United Nations Charter, which calls for respect for human rights
without regard to race, sex, language or religion, U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56. See also
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No.
8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
193, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1979); O.A.S. Doe. 65 rev. 1 (1979); G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1968); G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948).
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B. Defendants' Arguments
The defendants argue that the IOC has the exclusive power to
determine which events will be held. The IOC Charter vests in the
IOC the sole authority for such decision-making,26 although the
IOC may delegate control over technical aspects of the games to
international federations. 27 Therefore, the other defendants are not
21responsible for the decision.
The defendants also assert that the plaintiffs lack standing29
and that the holding of the 5,000-meter and 10,000-meter events
exclusively for men does not constitute unlawful sex discrimina-
tion. 30 In addition, the defendants argue that the statutes cited by
the plaintiffs do not allow for injunctive relief, 31 that no state action
is involved, 32 and that participation in the Olympics is a privilege,
not a right. 33 Finally, the defendants argue that the principles of
federalism, abstention and equity jurisprudence dictate that a fed-
eral court should not grant the equitable relief sought. 34
26. "The IOC is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and
the Olympic movement." IOC CHARTER rule 23. "The IOC in consultation with the IFs
[International Federations] concerned shall decide the events which shall be included in each
sport ...." Id. rule 32. See Defendants Los Angeles Coliseum Commission and James F.
Hardy's Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Injunctive Relief at
13, Martin v. International Olympic Comm., No. 83-5847 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 9, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Defendants' Answer].
27. IOC CHARTER rule 23. Technical control includes appointing referees, judges, um-
pires, timekeepers, inspectors and a jury. Id. rule 43.
28. Defendants' Answer, supra note 26, at 13. The defendants state that "the IOC
Charter speaks for itself." Id. See supra note 26.
29. Defendants' Answer, supra note 26, at 15.
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues ...." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) [which includes] not only a
"distinct and palpable injury" . .. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), but
also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 261 (1977).
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).
30. Defendants' Answer, supra note 26, at 15. Therefore, the defendants allege that
"the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief can be sought."
Id.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
A. Structure
The IOC, a Swiss corporation, 5 is entrusted with the control
and development of the modern Olympic Games.36 The IOC is a
corporate body by international law 37 possessing juridical status 3
and perpetual succession.3 9
The IOC has supreme authority over the Olympic Games. 40
Members of the IOC are its representatives in their respective coun-
tries; they do not serve as national delegates to the IOC.41 Instruc-
tions from any government or any other organization cannot bind
IOC members. 4 Although the IOC assigns technical control over
events to international federations, 43 it maintains authority over all
questions of a nontechnical nature, 44 including interpretation of the
35. IOC CHARTER rule 11. Rule 11 of the Charter states:
The IOC was created by the Congress of Paris of 23rd June 1894; it was
entrusted with the control and development of the modern Olympic Games;
It is a body corporate by international law having juridical status and perpet-
ual succession. Its headquarters are in Switzerland. It is not formed for profit and
has as its aims:
-to encourage the organisation and development of sport and sports competi-
tions;
-to inspire and lead sport within the Olympic ideal, thereby promoting and
strengthening friendship between the sportsmen of all countries;
-to ensure the regular celebration of the Olympic Games;
-to make the Olympic Games ever more worthy of their glorious history and
of the high ideals which inspired their revival by Baron Pierre de Coubertin
and his associates.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The term juridical status is not defined by the Charter. Juridical status means a
distinct legal entity, separate from the persons who own it. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
39. IOC CHARTER rule 11. Perpetual succession is not defined by rule 11. However, the
Charter does state that I[t]he IOC is a permanent organisation." Id. rule 12.
40. Id. rule 23. "The IOC is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic
Games and the Olympic movement." Id.
41. Id. rule 12.
42. Id. "They may not accept from governments or from any organisations or individ-
uals instructions which shall in any way bind them or interfere with the independence of
their vote." Id.
43. Id. rule 23. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. IOC CHARTER rule 16.
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rules. 45 Any decision on whether to hold the 5,000-meter and
10,000-meter races must be approved by the IOC, as it is consid-
ered a question of a substantive, nontechnical nature.
46
B. Relationship to the USOC and the LAOOC
The USOC was created by an act of Congress for the purpose
of organizing American participation in the Olympics. 47 The act
expressly provides that the USOC has the power to sue and be
sued. 48 The IOC approved the USOC as a national Olympic com-
mittee on the condition that the USOC acknowledge the supreme
authority of the IOC 49 and agree to be independent of governmen-
tal or political pressure.50
The USOC has the power to settle disputes involving American
participation in the .Olympics,5' but it must do so in accordance
with IOC rules.5 2 A violation of the IOC's rules would subject the
USOC to disciplinary sanctions.5 3 Such sanctions may include an
45. Id.
46. The events are governed by the technical rules of the international federation
concerned. Id. rule 32. However,. -[t]he IOC in consultation with the IFs concerned shall
decide the events which shall be included in each sport, in bearing with the global aspect of
the Olympic programme and statistical data referring to the number of participating coun-
tries in each event .... Id.
47. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-393 (Supp. 111978). The corporation has the power to "organize,
finance and control the representation of the United States in the competitions and events of
the Olympic Games .... Id. § 375(a)(3)
48. Id. § 375(6). The USOC was sued in 1980 for failing to send a team to the 1980
Summer Olympics in Moscow. DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp.
1181 (D.D.C. 1980). The court ruled in favor of the USOC, holding, inter alia, that
participation in the Olympics is not a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 1194.
49. "Every person or organisation that plays any part whatsoever in the Olympic
movement shall accept the supreme authority of the IOC ...." IOC CHARTER rule 4. For a
discussion of the IOC, see supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
50. The USOC "must be autonomous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatso-
ever, whether of a political, religious or economic nature." Id. rule 24.
51. The USOC has "exclusive jurisdiction ... over all matters pertaining to the partici-
pation of the United States in the Olympic Games . . . including the representation of the
United States in such games .... 36 U.S.C. § 374(3).
- 52. IOC CHARTER rule 4. The USOC "must guarantee that the Games shall be organised
to the satisfaction of and in accordance with the requirements of the IOC." Id.
53. Id. rule 25. "[T]he NOC [National Olympic Committee] of a country where the
Olympic Games are held may have its recognition withdrawn or have penalties imposed on it
under this Rule in the event of the OCOG [Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games, in
this case the LAOOC] not fulfilling the conditions under which the Olympic Games were
allocated." Id. An end to recognition would prevent participation by American athletes, as
all contestants must belong to a national Olympic committee. Id. rule 36.
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end to the IOC's recognition of the USOC or the disqualification of
American athletes from participation in track events. 54 The Ama-
teur Sports Act55 gives the USOC exclusive jurisdiction over matters
pertinent to United States participation and over the organization
of the Olympic Games when they are held in the United States. 5
The Act authorizes the USOC to do all acts necessary and proper for
that purpose. 57
The LAOOC is a California corporation, 58 functioning in the
same way that a host city has in previous Olympics. 59 The LAOOC
contracted, along with the USOC, to operate the games as an agent
of the IOC.60 Before its bid was accepted, the LAOOC was re-
quired to demonstrate that the City of Los Angeles and the govern-
ment of the United States would abide by the IOC rules and
bylaws, and guarantee that no laws, regulations or customs would
"limit, restrict or interfere with the Games in any way." '
III. AMENABILITY TO SUIT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC LAW
A. Legal Personality under International Law
The IOC may be sued if it is found to have international legal
personality (also referred to as legal capacity) .62 The law in this
54. Id. rules 25, 44.
55. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-393 (Supp. 11 1978).
56. 36 U.S.C. § 374(3). Pertinent matters include representing the United States in
relations with the IOC, id. § 375(a)(2); making contracts, id. § 375(a)(7); and financing
United States participation, id. § 375(a)(3).
57. Id. § 375(a)(16).
58. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 6.
59. Eve of a New Olympics, TIME, Oct. 17, 1983, at 72-81. This is the first time a
corporation, rather than a city, is operating the Olympics. Id. at 76, 78. A "host city" would
traditionally organize, finance and operate the Games. See supra note 3.
60. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 14.
61. IOC CHARTER at 78 (Questionnaire for Candidate Cities Applying for the Games).
The LAOOC also had to guarantee that the United States government and the City of Los
Angeles would abide by IOC rules. Id. The Organizing Committee "shall function by virtue
of the powers which shall have been delegated to it within prescribed limits, and it may not
usurp the powers and responsibilities of the IOC .... It must settle all outstanding questions
and disputes concerning the Olympic Games to the satisfaction of the IOC." IOC CHARTER
rule 52.
62. For the definition of legal capacity, see supra note 9. "Possession of such interna-
tional personality will normally involve, as a consequence, the attribution of power ... to
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area is unclear, as courts have used different approaches to deter-
mine legal personality,6 3 and have often bypassed the issue alto-
gether .64
Two distinct tests have been used to determine whether an
international organization has legal personality.6 5 These methods
are the inductive approach 6  and the objective approach. 7 The
inductive approach requires analysis of the organizing documents
of the international body to determine the purpose of the organiza-
tion.6 8 If the organization was formed with attributes of legal per-
sonality, such as the power to contract, the power to sue and be
sued, and certain privileges and immunities,6 9 the organization
satisfies the inductive test.7 0
The objective approach,7 1 in contrast, involves a four part test:
the organization must be more than simply a center "for harmoniz-
undertake legal proceedings . D. BowETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
302 (1975). The analysis deals with organizations created by states. Lashbrooke, Suits Against
International Organizations in Federal Court: OPEC, A Case Study, Calif. W. Int'l L.J. 305,
306 (1982). The IOC consists of national Olympic committees. IOC CHARTER rule 24.
National Olympic committees are created by governments, see, e.g., 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-393
(Supp. 111978) (Congress creates the USOC), and'include all IOC members in their respec-
tive countries. IOC CHARTER rule 24.
63. D. BowErr, supra note 62, at 299-304. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying
text.
64. In International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.
553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), af'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1981), the court did not address the issue, but stated that "OPEC could not be and
had not been legally served." Id. at 560. See Lashbrooke, supra note 62, at 305-24, for a
discussion of OPEC's legal capacity.
65. D. BowETT, supra note 62, at 299-304; Lashbrooke, supra note 62, at 306-12. See
infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
66. Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of Interna-
tional Organizations, 44 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 112 (1970); Lashbrooke, supra note 62, at
306.
67. See Lashbrooke, supra note 62, at 306; Rama-Montaldo, supra note 66, at 112.
68. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 522 (1966). "[i]n the first
instance the evidence of legal capacity is to be found in the constituent treaty of the particular
organization." Id. "Those who adopt this approach generally link it with the foundation of
the personality or the will of the states either express or implied." Rama-Montaldo, supra
note 66, at 112.
69. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 68, at 518-22.
70. D. BowETT, supra note 62, at 308-14.
71. The objective approach was set forth by the International Court of Justice in the
Reparations case. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-79. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85. See
generally Lashbrooke, supra note 62, at 310-12.
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ing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends"; 72 it must possess an infrastructure;7 3 it must perform special
tasks; 4 and it must occupy a position "in certain respects in detach-
ment from its members. '7 5
The IOC has legal personality under the inductive test, 76 as it
is incorporated under international law, and possesses juridical
status.77 The IOC Charter allows the IOC to contract with organi-
zations in other nations,78 and to assert independence from political
and governmental control. 79
The IOC also satisfies the four elements of the objective test.
The IOC is more than simply a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations participating in the Olympic Games, as its members have
rights and duties within the organization.8" It has an infrastructure,
consisting of officers,8' national Olympic committees, 82 and its own
rules and bylaws. 83 The committee performs a special task: to
promote and govern the Olympics. 84 Finally, the IOC has a life of
its own, as it has perpetual succession, 85 i.e., it continues to exist
although member states may withdraw and new ones may join the
organization.
72. Reparations, 1949 I.C.J. at 178. The United Nations is more than a center of
harmony among nations in that its members have powers and responsibilities within the
organization itself. Id. A congress of states would not satisfy this criterion. Lashbrooke, supra
note 62, at 310. This requires that the members "have mutual rights and duties within the
organization." Rama-Montaldo, supra note 62, at 125 n.2.
73. Reparations, 1949 I.C.J. at 178. The United Nations, for example, has organs which
constitute an infrastructure. Id.
74. id.
75. Id. at 178-79.
76. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
77. IOC CHARTER rule 11.
78. Id. rule 53.
79. Id. rule 12. Members of the IOC are representatives of the IOC in their respective
countries. They are not delegates to the IOC. Id. For a discussion of the independence of IOC
members, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
80. IOC CHARTER rules 14, 15. lOC members have duties within the organization. Id.
81. Id. rule 14.
82. Id. rule 24.
83. Id. rule 4.
84. Id. rule 1. One of the.aims of the IOC is to "bring together the athletes of the world
in the great four-yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games." Id.
85. Id. rule 11. The IOC "is a permanent organisation.'" Id. rule 12.
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B. International Organizations Immunities Act
The International Organizations Immunites Act (IOIA) pro-
vides immunity for "public international organizations" 6 of which
the United States is a member.8 7 The President is directed to deter-
mine which international organizations are immune.s8 The IOC is
probably not a public organization because, although it is created
by governments, it maintains independence from all governmental
control.8 9 Even if the IOIA could apply, the IOC has not been
designated by the President as an exempt organization. 90
C. Presidential Assurances
The executive branch has consistently assured the IOC that it
would abide by IOC decisions when the Games are held in the
United States. 91 Judicial action in Martin would be inconsistent
86. International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976).
87. Id.
88. Id. The other statute that applies to an international body is the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). The Act grants immunity to foreign states to the
extent they engage in noncommercial activity. Id. The statute is essentially a codification of
the act of state doctrine. See generally Kahale, Characterizing Nationalization for Purposes
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FOROHAM INT'L L.J.
391 (1983). The statute does not apply to the IOC, since it is not a state and its actions are not
attributable to any government. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
89. The IOIA does not define "public organization," but the legislative history of the
IOIA refers to those organizations "that are composed of governments as members." H.R.
REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 946. The IOC, though created by member states, see supra note 62, maintains
independence from governmental control. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
90. See 22 U.S.C. § 288, for a list of the organizations receiving immunity pursuant to
executive order.
91. The Justice Department filed a Statement of Interest in Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake
Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 535, aff'd 49 N.Y.2d 771,
403 N.E.2d 178, 426 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Statement of Interest]. In
opposing judicial intervention, the Justice Department stated:
The United States has a substantial foreign policy interest in maintaining its
ability to host international sporting events such as the Olympic Games in a manner
consistent with decisions reached by the international bodies managing those events.
In connection with its hosting of the 1980 Olympic Games, the United States has
repeatedly committed to the IOC that the United States would be bound by the list
of invitees and the conditions of participation set by the IOC. . . .That commit-
ment was based on our "recognition of the private character of the International
Olympic Committee and the games."
Statement of Interest, supra, app. 3.
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with these promises. 2 The assurances were required by the IOC as
part of the agreement with the LAOOC, the USOC and the City of
Los Angeles to host the 1984 Games.13 Congress has neither ap-
proved nor disapproved such executive action; the Amateur Sports
Act, which pertains to Olympic matters, is silent in this regard. 4
In Martin, the Presidential assurances to the IOC were neither
based on inherent constitutional power,"5 nor were they authorized
by statute. 6 However, the President has broad powers in foreign
affairs,9 7 and the hosting of the Olympics involves substantial for-
eign policy considerations. 9 Therefore, the assurances to the IOC
could be based on the President's foreign policy power.
The Statement of Interest was made during the 1980 Games at Lake Placid, Ren-Guey,
72 A.D.2d at 441, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 537, two years after the 1984 Summer Olympics had been
awarded to Los Angeles by the IOC. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 14. For the
Justice Department's view of judicial intervention in the Games, see infra note 136.
In addition, the LAOOC had to demonstrate that the City of Los Angeles and the
United States would abide by IOC rules. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92. The IOC has the authority to determine which events will be held. IOC CHARTER
rule 32.
93. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
94. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-393 (Supp. 11 1978).
95. This would include the power to recognize foreign governments. See United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). In Belmont, the President recognized the Soviet
government for the purpose of settling claims between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Id. at 326-27. As a result, certain Soviet assets were seized by the United States. Id.
The Supreme Court held that this action did not require Senate approval, and preempted
state laws regarding expropriation. Id. at 330. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942),
the Supreme Court held that the Lltvinov assignment (an assignment of certain claims
accepted by the Soviet government when it was recognized in 1933) gave the President the
power to form public policy regarding Soviet nationalization decrees without the consent of
the Senate. Id. at 229.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). In
Curtiss-Wright, the Court formulated the implied powers concept:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations ...
congressional legislation ... must often accord the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissable were domes-
tic affairs alone involved.
Id. See also infra note 99 and accompanying text for discussion of the President's foreign
policy power.
98. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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When Congress has approved action by a President in the area
of foreign affairs such action is presumptively valid.99 Congress
enacted the Amateur Sports Act'00 with the knowledge that the
USOC would be bound by the rules of the IOC. 1'0 It gave the
USOC exclusive jurisdiction over the Games when they are held in
the United States.' 0 2 It did not give the President the power to grant
immunity from suit to the 1OC,'13 and it expressly made the IOC's
agent, the USOC, amenable to suit.'0 4 Thus, it can be argued that
99. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from
Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Congress. In
such a case the executive action "would be supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation .... " [I]n the absence of
congressional authorization . . . the validity of the President's action ... hinges on
a consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the
Legislative Branch toward such action. . . . Finally, when the President acts in
contravention of the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court
can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting on the subject."
Id. at 668-69, (citations omitted) (quoting Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
In Dames & Moore, The Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act of 1977 gave the President the power to transfer Iranian assets out of the
United States as part of the hostage settlement. 453 U.S. at 675. In Youngstown, the President
ordered the seizure of steel to avert a nationwide strike that he thought would hurt national
defense. 343 U.S. at 582-83. The Court held that since Congress refused to authorize seizures
in the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976), the President was acting in opposition
to the will of Congress, and the seizure was invalid. 343 U.S. at 586.
The extent of the President's foreign policy power has always been debated. "A
judge . . . may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority
applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves."
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See generally Lofgren, United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973);
Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 Yale L.J. 664 (1944).
100. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-393 (Supp. 111978).
101. DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1187-88 (D.D.C.
1980). In DeFrantz, the court stated:
In writing this legislation, Congress did not create a new relationship between the
USOC and the IOC, Rather, it recognized an already long-existing relationship
between the two and statutorily legitimized that relationship .... Congress was
necessarily aware that a National Olympic Committee is a creation and a creature
of the International Olympic Committee, to whose rules and regulations it must
conform.
Id.
102. 36 U.S.C. § 374(3).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. 36 U.S.C. § 375(6).
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Congress intended that the Olympics be exclusively under the con-
trol of the USOC, which, in turn, is bound by United States law.
The reverse, however, may also be asserted; Congress, knowing
that the USOC would be bound by IOC rules,10 5 gave the USOC
control over the events,106 intending that the IOC's rules would be
respected. If this is true, the President's assurances to the IOC,
which permitted the IOC to award the 1984 Games to Los Angeles,
are consistent with congressional intent. Accordingly, it is not clear,
under the facts of Martin, whether the federal court is barred from
hearing a suit against the IOC.
IV. JUSTICIABILITY UNDER THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
Even if the IOC is amenable to suit, the court still must
determine whether the facts in Martin present a political ques-
tion. 0 7 The Supreme Court has set forth the criteria for determin-
ing the existence of a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potential-
ity of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on
the ground of a political question's presence. 08
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
108. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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A. Substantive Issues
The substantive issues in Martin do not present a political
question. Interpretation of sex discrimination laws requires no
action by a coordinate branch of government.109 This case is thus
distinguishable from Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic
Games, Inc. 10 In Ren-Guey, a Taiwanese athlete sought an injunc-
tion allowing Taiwan to enter the 1980 Winter Olympics with its
own flag, uniform and anthem.' 11 The trial court, in ruling for the
plaintiff, implicitly decided that Taiwan was an independent state
and that the Taiwanese athletes were being discriminated against
on the basis of nationality." 2 This decision was reversed, in part
because the recognition of nations is a matter that belongs to the
executive branch. "13
B. Procedural Issues
The procedural aspect of Martin-specifically, the assertion of
jurisdiction over the IOC-does not present a political question.
109. While the defendants assert that the statutes cited by the plaintiffs do not allow for
injunctive relief, Defendants' Answer, supra note 26, at 16, whether or not the court does
have this power is itself an aspect of statutory interpretation that is committed to the
judiciary. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
110. 72 A.D.2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 535, afj'd, 49 N.Y.2d 771, 403 N.E.2d 178, 426
N.Y.S.2d 473 (1980).
111. Id.
112. Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., No. 50-80, slip op. at
6-8 (Essex County Ct. Feb. 7, 1980), rev'd, 72 A.D.2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 535, afJ'd, 49
N.Y.2d 771, 403 N.E.2d 178, 426 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1980).
113. Ren-Guey, 72 A.D.2d at 441, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 537. In Ren-Guey, the Appellate
Division stated:
Whether a foreign government should be recognized is a political question that
neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other American court may re-
view. . . . In effect, plaintiff asks this court to compel the defendant, as surrogate of
the IOC, to recognize a symbol of national sovereignty. . . . Since the Department
of State, acting on behalf of the President, has elected to defer to the IOC in matters
concerning national representation at the Olympics, the issue involved in this appeal
is a political question. ...
Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed:
In view of the statement of interest submitted by the Attorney General of the
United States on behalf of the Department of State pursuant to section 517 of title 28
of the U.S. Code, we are persuaded that the courts of our State must refrain from
the exercise of jurisdiction to resolve a dispute which has at its core the international
"two-Chinas" problem.
Ren-Guey, 49 N.Y.2d at 773, 403 N.E.2d at 179, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
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While the legal capacity of international organizations is unclear, 114
the uncertainty of a legal issue does not make it a political ques-
tion."I Also, the fact that a suit against an international organiza-
tion involves foreign affairs does not, by itself, preclude the court
from hearing the case.1 16 While Congress and the President could
preempt the courts by granting immunity to the IOC, they have not
done so," 7 and the fact that they could does not prevent the courts
from hearing the case." 8
C. Policy Considerations
1. Foreign Affairs
Even if the issues in Martin can properly be adjudicated, the
political question doctrine may counsel restraint." 9 In Martin, an
Courts may treat an unrecognized sovereign as a nation for the purpose of being sued.
Wulfsohn v. Russian Rep., 234 N.Y. 372 (1923). Recognition, per se, however, is not within a
United States court's jurisdiction. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
115. In fact, it is the responsibility of the courts to determine when, and how, such
jurisdiction can be obtained. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. "Deciding whether a matter has in any
measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether
the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation. ... Id.
116. While some issues clearly require an initial policy determination of nonjudicial
discretion, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. Therefore, the fact that foreign policy consid-
erations are involved here does not, by itself, make it a political question.
117. The IOC is not immune under the IOIA, see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying
text, and, though the assurances given to the IOC by the executive branch may be binding,
see supra notes 91-106, whether they are is itself a question for the judiciary. See supra note
115.
118. This is true where action by the other branches of government could be conclusive
on the matter, but they have not spoken. "[T]hough a court will not ordinarily inquire
whether a treaty has been terminated, since on that question 'governmental action . . . must
be regarded as of controlling importance,' if there has been no conclusive 'governmental
action' then a court can construe a treaty and may find it provides the answer." Baker, 369
U.S. at 212. However, this involvement with foreign policy is a consideration, even if it is not
binding. See infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
119. Policy considerations related to the political question doctrine include "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; .. .or the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
1984] IOC AMENABILITY TO SUIT
injunction would interfere with the contract between the IOC,
USOC and LAOOC,120 and thus hinder our foreign policy.' 2' Host-
ing the Olympics and maintaining friendly relations with interna-
tional organizations in general are important methods of improving
standing in the international community.122 Judicial intervention
may interfere with this goal. If the President's commitments can be
dishonored by the courts, the ability of the United States to host
international sporting events will be seriously impaired. 23
In Martin, the court must determine whether the interest in
hearing the case outweighs foreign policy considerations. 24 The
American interest in Martin may be weak, as only nine of the
plaintiffs are United States citizens. 125 Moreover, if the court hears
this case, there would be a violation of the IOC's rules, 26 which
would be grounds for withdrawing recognition of the USOC, 27 an
120. IOC CHARTER at 78 (Questionnaire for Candidate Cities Applying for the Games).
The LAOOC had to guarantee that no "laws, regulations or customs" would "limit, restrict
or interfere with the games in any way." Id.
121. "It is fundamental to our constitutional scheme that in dealing with other nations
the country must speak with a united voice." Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353
F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). In Republic of Iraq, Iraq
attempted to recover a bank account in New York owned by the late King Faisal II, whose
property had been confiscated under Iraqi law. Id. at 49-50. Because the case involved an act
by a foreign state, the court stated that it would give it affect only if it were consistent with
the laws and policies of the United States. Id. at 50-51. The court held that it was not, and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal. Id. at 51. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1981). "To participate adeptly
in the global community, the United States must speak with one voice and pursue a careful
and deliberate foreign policy." Id. at 1358.
122. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
124. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). "It is also evident
that some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do
others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches." Id. In comparing the act of state
doctrine to the political question doctrine, the court in Machinists noted that the act of state
doctrine "requires that the courts defer to the legislative and executive branches when those
branches are better equipped to resolve a politically sensitive question. Like the political
question doctrine, its applicability is not subject to clear definition. The courts balance
various factors to determine whether the doctrine should apply." 649 F.2d at 1358-59.
125. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 3. In addition, since each nation may
only enter three contestants in each event, IOC CHARTER rule 37, the maximum number of
American athletes who would benefit from the addition of two events is six. Indeed, the
figure might be less, since some athletes may run in both events.
126. Rule 32 of the Charter gives the IOC authority to determine which events will be
held. IOC CHARTER rule 32. See also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
78 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:61
act that would prevent participation by United States athletes in
the future. 128
The interest in hosting future international sports events may
also be a consideration. 2  The United States Department of State
believes that the IOC and similar sports organizations may shun the
United States as a host rather than submit to its domestic laws. 130 In
addition, even when the events are held outside the United States,
the United States has an interest in ensuring free participation by all
American athletes, including the plaintiffs in Martin.131 If United
States courts assert jurisdiction over the IOC, other nations may be
encouraged to interfere with sporting events held in their countries.
While both of these fears are speculative, they are plausible and are
entitled to serious consideration.
Despite these concerns, this case may be justiciable. The appli-
cation of United States law could aid our foreign policy by demon-
strating that the United States is committed to equality. In addi-
tion, adding two events may place only a slight burden on the
IOC.'32 Policy considerations do not prevent domestic courts from
issuing orders against a sovereign that has chosen to take advantage
of United States courts. 33 Accordingly, they should not prevent
128. Id.
129. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
131. 36 U.S.C. § 374(5). One of the purposes of the USOC is to "promote and support
amateur athletic activities involving the United States and foreign nations." Id.
132. The plaintiffs assert that the events "could be added to the Olympic program
schedule in a time period of around or about thirty days without injury to any of the
defendants." Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 15. The defendants deny this. Defend-
ants' Answer, supra note 26, at 9.
133. Republic of France v. Standard Oil Co., 491 F. Supp. 161, 169 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
afJ'd sub nom. In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" Off Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909 (7th
Cir. 1983). In R'epublic of France, the Republic of France filed a suit to recover damages
from an oil spill. Noting the inequity of allowing France to sue in a United States court while
disallowing counterclaims on the basis of the act of state doctrine, the court noted:
[T]o allow the Republic of France to litigate its claims in this country and to cloak
itself with immunity, based on the act of state doctrine, as to counterclaims and
third party claims, would be unjust. ...
A judicially fashioned doctrine should not be applied to work an injustice,
particularly where the application of the doctrine would not serve the interests it
was fashioned to protect.
Id. at 169. Accordingly, the counterclaims against France were not dismissed. Id. In Ghana
Supply Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586 (D. Mass. 1979), when a
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domestic courts from issuing orders against an international organi-
zation that is receiving substantial benefits from the United
States.
34
Finally, it is not clear that the type of interference contem-
plated by the IOC Charter and by the United States government in
its assurances to the IOC includes judicial intervention. 35 The
Justice Department, in Ren-Guey, argued that United States assur-
ances precluded such interference, 36 but this issue was not decided
by the court. 37
Nonetheless, the balance of foreign policy considerations is
against hearing the case. The embarassment of inconsistent posi-
tions by two branches of the United States government, the disqual-
ification of American athletes and the possibility that the United
States would not be able to host the Olympics in the future are risks
that exceed any possible benefit that the United States would derive
from hearing the case.
2. Enforceability
In addition to foreign policy considerations, Martin may not
be justiciable because the injunction that the plaintiffs seek may be
ineffective. 3 An injunction against the IOC may be unenforceable
Ghanaian corporation instituted a civil action through a United States subsidiary, the latter
was not allowed to claim the executive privilege of the nation of Ghana with respect to
discovery orders, Id. at 594.
134. The IOC has selected an American site because it is suitable for the Games, see
supra note 16, and has an American corporation, the LAOOC, financing and operating the
Games in accordance with its rules. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
135. IOC CHARTER rule 24 refers to "pressures of any kind whatsoever." The United
States has agreed to abide by IOC rules. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
When the USOC, in response to President Carter's decision to boycott the 1980 Summer
Olympics, decided not to send a team to the Games, the IOC ruled that the USOC did not
violate rule 24 of the IOC Charter, DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192 n.23. In DeFrantz,
however, the USOC had no duty to send a team, id., whereas, in Martin, the USOC and the
LAOOC have undertaken the responsibility of operating the Games under the IOC's guide-
lines. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
136. Statement of Interest, supra note 91, at 3. "The United States believes that judicial
intervention in the IOC's management of the games is inconsistent with the United States'
commitment to observe the rules established by the IOC and calls into question the ability of
the United States to host other international sporting events." Id.
137. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
138. A plaintiff must show that his injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). In determining
whether an injury is redressable, "the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of
1984]
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since only the IOC has the power to determine which events will be
held,""9 and the IOC can ignore the order as it is outside the United
States.140 Even if Switzerland were inclined to recognize and en-
force the United States judgment,1 4 1 the judgment may be rendered
too late for Swiss action before the Games. 42 Moreover, Switzer-
land may also be unable to enforce an injunction. If the IOC does
not meet in Switzerland between the time the United States judg-
ment is issued and the start of the Games, 43 a Swiss court cannot
force the IOC to add these events.144 In Ren-Guey, the injunction
deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded." Baker,
369 U.S. at 198.
In Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977), a state representative challenged the
underrepresentation of his party on legislative committees. Id. at 122. The court stated that
we cannot discover a manageable standard for resolving the problem." Id. at 125. Cf.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, a member of the House of Represent-
atives who was denied a seat in Congress sought a declaratory judgment upholding his right
to be seated. Id. at 489-93. The Court held that since the plaintiff sought only a declaratory
judgment, not enforcement, the case was justiciable despite difficulties in compelling Con-
gress to seat him. Id. at 517.
139. IOC CHARTER rule 32.
140. The IOC is headquartered in Switzerland. Id. rule 11.
141. Civil law nations, such as Switzerland, will generally recognize a judgment if there
was a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court. A. EHRENZwEiG & E. JAYME,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 n.23 (1973).
[T]here is not much danger that Swiss judgments will be denied recognition and
enforcement in the United States on the ground of lack of reciprocity, or that this
will happen to American judgments in Switzerland. Still, under Swiss as well as
American law, recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be denied
on grounds other than lack of reciprocity. Thus lack of opportunity for the defend-
ant to be heard in the foreign proceedings or incompatibility of the foreign decision
with the public policy of the forum will bar the enforcement of an American
judgment in Switzerland, just as they bar the enforcement of a Swiss judgment in
this country.
A. NUSSBAUM, No. 1, AMERICAN-SwIss PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (2d ed. 1958).
Accordingly, a Swiss court may deny recognition if it determines that the American judgment
is inconsistent with Swiss law, or there is a Swiss public policy in favor of giving the IOC
freedom in choosing events.
142. The relief that the plaintiffs seek applies only to the 1984 Summer Olympics.
Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 18-20. Therefore, if the litigation in the United States
and the subsequent recognition and enforcement in Switzerland cannot be completed before
the opening of the 1984 Games, the issue would become moot.
143. The IOC is not required to meet more than once a year, IOC CHARTER rule 17, and
it may meet at any place fixed by the IOC. Id. Consequently, it will not necessarily meet in
Switzerland between the final decision in Martin and the start of the Games.
144. The IOC's members include no more than two people from the same country, id.
rule 12, so there is no country where a majority of them reside. The IOC needs a majority of
its members to constitute a quorum. Id. rule 18. Since the IOC must approve the addition of
events for them to be official, id. rule 32, it would be impossible for Switzerland, or any other
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did not present these problems. The court simply ordered that the
defendant be restrained from interfering with Taiwan's participa-
tion in the Games. 145
The court might order an injunction against only the USOC
and the LAOOC, but the defendants assert that the IOC is solely
responsible for decisions regarding the games. 146 The argument that
the IOC retains sole authority to determine what events will be
held was also used in Ren-Guey. In Ren-Guey, the Lake Placid
Olympic Committee argued, inter alia, that the LOC 47 had the sole
authority to decide whether Taiwanese athletes should be allowed
to have their own flag, anthem and uniform. 48 The Lake Placid
Olympic Committee had the same role that the LAOOC has now;
it contracted with the IOC to operate the Games in accordance
with the IOC's rules. 14 In Ren-Guey, the issue of whether the Lake
Placid Olympic Committee had any control over the matter was
never reached. 150
An injunction against the USOC and the LAOOC, although
enforceable,' 5' creates several problems. Scheduling the track
events would interfere with the contract between the IOC, USOC
and LAOOC. 52 Such interference might subject the USOC and
country, to compel the addition of Olympic events without the IOC members convening
there.
145. The court ordered "that the defendant be enjoined from doing or failing to do any
act which would make it impossible for the plaintiff to participate in the 1980 Lake Placid
Winter Olympics and to enjoy the same privileges as are extended to all athletes from all
nations." Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., No. 50-80, slip. op. at
9 (Essex County Ct. Feb. 7, 1980), rev'd, 72 A.D.2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 535, afJ'd, 49 N.Y.2d
771, 403 N.E.2d 178, 426 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1980).
146. Defendants' Answer, supra note 26, at 13.
147. The IOC was not a defendant in Ren-Cuey. The sole defendant was the Lake
Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc. Ren-Guey, 49 N.Y.2d at 771, 403 N.E.2d at 178, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 473.
148. Ren-Guey, No. 50-80, slip op. at 1-2. The trial court noted that the defendant
agreed to conduct the games "pursuant to rules established by the International Olympic
Committee." Id, at 2. It also noted that "the defendant takes the position that it is powerless
to do anything other than to follow the orders of the International Olympic Committee." Id.
at 3.
149. Id. at 1-2.
150. The decision was reversed on the grounds that the recognition of Taiwan presented
a political question. See supra note 113.
151. Since the USOC is based in Colorado, see supra note 15, and the LAOOC is based
in California, see supra note 16, there would not be a problem obtaining recognition from the
court of a foreign country. Cf. supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
152. See supra .note 60 and accompanying text.
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American athletes to some type of disciplinary action. 5 3 In addi-
tion, the events may not be recognized by the IOC, hence medals
might not be awarded.15 4 In either case, an injunction may be
undesirable.
CONCLUSION
The IOC has the legal capacity, under international law, to be
sued.' -5 It is not immune from suit under the IOIA,156 and it is not
necessarily precluded from suit by the President's assurances. 5 7 In
addition, the issues in Martin, despite their novelty, do not present
a political question.15 8 The substantive and procedural aspects of
this case are appropriate for adjudication. 59
Policy considerations, however, compel restraint. The United
States interest in hearing this case must be considered in light of the
difficulty of enforcing injunctive relief,160 and the fact that doing so
may interfere with our foreign policy and hinder our participation
in international athletics.'"' While an appropriate case-for exam-
ple, a suit requesting an injunction restraining the IOC from an
activity-may be justiciable, the suit in Martin v. International
Olympic Committee6 2 is not justiciable. 16 3
James G. Goettel
153. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
154. In addition, if events that the IOC does not recognize are held, the LAOOC would
violate rule 55 of the IOC Charter. This rule prohibits holding other international sports
events in the Olympic city during the Games. Id.
155. See supra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
162. Martin v. International Olympic Comm., No. 83-5847 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 9,
1983).
163. After this Note went to press, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction.
Martin v. International Olympic Committee, No. 83-5847, slip. op. at 38 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
16, 1984). The court, noting that a preliminary injunction "must never be granted except in a
case clearly warranting such action," id. at 14, found that the evidence presented so far has
"not shown sufficiently that these defendants have violated the standards set forth in these
laws." Id. at 38. The court did not discuss either the amenability of the IOC to suit or the
political question issues discussed in this Note. The plaintiffs plan an immediate appeal.
Chariots of Litigation, TiME, Apr. 30, 1984, at 80. In addition, new lawsuits are pending
against the IOC regarding the eligibility of athletes, id. at 80-81, thus increasing the judicial
interference with the Olympic Games and the importance of the issues presented in this Note.
